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Abstract 
Vietnam grew from an insignificant to the world’s  second largest coffee  producer during 
the 1990s. To understand this growth, this paper examines Vietnamese coffee growers’ 
investment decisions using real options theory. The study finds that producers, with variable 
costs of 19 cents/lb and total cost of 29.3 cents/lb, would enter coffee production at a coffee price 
of 47 cents/lb and exit at a coffee price of 14 cents/lb. Most Vietnamese growers appear to be 
sufficiently efficient to continue producing coffee even at relatively depressed price levels. 
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A Real Options Analysis of Coffee Planting in Vietnam 
 
by 
 
Quoc Luong and Loren W. Tauer 
 
In 1989 Vietnam held a market share of only 1.2% of the world coffee market. Ten years 
later Vietnam surpassed Colombia to become the world’s second largest coffee exporter with a 
market share of 12.4%, earning approximately US $600 million and accounting for roughly 17% 
of all Vietnam’s commodity exports.  Vietnam’s growth is unique in the history of coffee 
production and has had significant impacts on both Vietnam’s economy and the global coffee 
industry. Coffee production now provides the livelihood for an estimated four million people in 
Vietnam.  
The massive increase in Vietnam’s coffee supply is widely believed to be the main factor 
leading to the price crisis of 2001. This price collapse substantially devastated the livelihoods of 
25 million poor coffee producing households in more than 50 developing countries including 
Vietnam. Despite Vietnam’s significant role, little research has been completed to help 
understand Vietnam’s coffee supply response. Partly because of such a lack of understanding, 
policies implemented to assist Vietnamese farmers have failed. For instance, the government 
attempted an export retention scheme in 2001, which did not boost farmers’ income, yet incurred 
heavy losses to the state budget. More recently, the Vietnam Coffee and Cocoa Association has 
discussed a plan to cut 100,000-150,000 hectares of coffee as a remedy to the global oversupply 
problem. But it remains unclear how much such a plan could raise the world coffee price, if 
implemented, or where in Vietnam those 100,000-150,000 hectares would be eliminated. 
The coffee tree was introduced into Vietnam by the French as early as the 1850s, 
although production remained limited until 1989. The adoption of market-oriented policies by 
the government at the end of the 1980s and the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA) in 1989 provided Vietnamese coffee producers with the necessary conditions to compete 
freely and globally.  Coffee production grew 26% annually from 1990-2001. 
Nearly all coffee grown in Vietnam is of the Robusta variety.  Only 4% of coffee grown 
is consumed domestically, with the rest exported. Between 85-90% of planted area is cultivated 
by small farmers, each holding from 1 to 2 hectares. The remainder (10%-15%) is grown by 
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state-owned farms (SOFs). The four provinces of Kon Tum, Dak Lak, Gia Lai, and Lam Dong in 
the Central Highland account for over 80% of coffee production. Arabica is produced mainly at a 
subsistence level in mountainous regions in the North. 
Only 13 years (1990-2002) of data are available to analyze Vietnamese coffee supply. 
Before 1990, the world coffee market was tightly regulated through quotas by the ICA, of which 
Vietnam was not a member. Only after the collapse of the ICA in 1989, did the global coffee 
market become fully competitive and open to Vietnamese coffee growers. As such, prices before 
1990 might not be appropriate for modeling the explosive expansion of supply from Vietnam, 
which occurred under recent competitive market conditions. Moreover, the 13 years of data do 
not cover even one complete cycle of upward and downward movements in supply, but rather 
mostly an increasing trend, which casts doubt on the ability of regression models to accurately 
capture supply response. Given the limited data, Vietnam’s coffee supply is modeled as the 
outcome of the entry-exit decisions of coffee growers using real options theory. This approach 
permits modeling investment decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility and captures supply 
response through investment decisions. 
Previous Studies 
Most previous studies of coffee supply response use regression-based models. Coffee 
production is typically decomposed into two parts:  potential production (investment) as a long-
term component, and the proportion of potential production harvested as a short-term component 
[Wickens and Greenfield (1973)].  The investment component is usually seen as comprising the 
planting decision, modeled as a function of coffee prices lagged the length of the gestation 
period, and the removal decision, determined by one-year lagged and current prices [Arak 
(1969)]. The yield decision is explained, in most studies, through three variables: current price, 
price lagged one year, and output lagged one year. The current and one-year lagged prices 
represent the expected immediate returns. The inclusion of one-year lagged output accounts for 
the biennial production cycle of Arabica, especially in Brazil.  Some models omitted years of 
weather shocks, while others used a dummy variable to account for weather impacts.  These 
Nerlove-type models have generally found long-term elasticities to be higher than short-term 
elasticities [Renne, 1987]. 
The role of fixed assets in agricultural production, investment and disinvestments was 
first discussed intensively by Glenn Johnson nearly 50 years ago. Johnson (1958) defined fixed 
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assets as those whose expected value in their present use does not exceed their marginal 
acquisition cost and does not fall below what could be realized for them if they were diverted to 
an alternative use. With this definition, a fixed asset has two important features: an acquisition 
price and a salvage price. For investment, a firm matches the value of an additional fixed asset, 
which is determined by the services of the asset over its lifetime, with its acquisition price. For 
disinvestment, the firm equates the present value of the fixed asset in use with its salvage price.  
Investment and disinvestment decisions, hence, depend on the differential between the 
acquisition and salvage prices. If the two are equal, the fixed assets become fully variable. In 
contrast, if the acquisition price and salvage value differ substantially, durable assets become 
fixed, and changes in output, if any, would not be influenced by investment despite possibly 
wide variations in output price. Because of asset fixity, supply response was found to be more 
elastic at the acquisition and salvage price levels and inelastic within this price range. Supply 
was found to be more inelastic in the short run than in the long run and was more elastic to price 
rising than price falling. However, quantifying the impacts of asset fixity on investment/ 
disinvestment in agriculture remained unanswered until McDonald and Siegel (1985), Dixit 
(1991), and others introduced the concept of real options theory to model asset fixity. 
Applications of real options concepts to agricultural investment decisions include Richards and 
Patterson (1998), Carey and Zilberman (2002), Purvis, Boggess, Moss, and Holt (1995), among 
others. 
The Model 
In the simple entry-exit model, a firm must invest a sum K to build a project to produce a 
unit flow of output at a variable cost C. This investment project is assumed to last forever and be 
non-depreciating. The firm has to pay an exit cost per unit of output X if it decides to exit, and 
must incur the entry cost K again if it wishes to re-invest. K, X, and C are assumed to be constant 
and nonstochastic. A unit of the output can be sold at a market price P determined exogenously 
by the market. Hence, uncertainty comes from the market price P. As will be seen in the 
empirical application, the Vietnamese coffee industry reasonably satisfies these assumptions. 
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The model is built through 3 steps: 
• Step 1 – Determine the value of an idle project. An idle project means that the investment is 
waiting to be initiated. At this stage the value of the investment is just the value of the option 
to invest.  
• Step 2 – Determine the value of an active project. An active project means that the 
investment is in operation. The value of the investment now comprises both the present value 
of the net revenue generated by the project and the value of the option to abandon the project. 
• Step 3 – Simultaneously determine the entry and exit points. At the investment entry/ 
abandonment points, the investor must be indifferent between being “idle” or “active”. This 
results in two equilibrium conditions. First, the value of an idle project must equal the value 
of an active project. Second, the rate of change of an idle project’s value must also be equal 
to the rate of change of an active project’s value. So, equating the values of the idle and 
active project as well as their derivatives produces a system of four equations. To properly 
account for the fact that the exit option also includes the ability to re-enter, the four 
differential equations must be solved simultaneously. Although a closed form solution is not 
available, numerical results can be obtained for the investment entry/exit points. 
The mathematics of the model is based on Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), and Hull, J. 
C. (1997), using the following notation. 
V0: the value of an idle investment, 
V1:  the value of an active investment, 
P: Market selling price of a unit of output produced from the investment, 
µ:  Expected percent growth rate of market price P, if any, 
σ2:  Variance rate of the percentage change in market price P, 
C:  Variable cost of a unit of output produced from the investment, 
K:  Sunk cost of investment per unit of output, 
X: Cost of investment abandonment per unit of output, 
ρ:  Opportunity cost of capital (the firm’s discount rate) with ρ > µ, 
H:  Market price level at which investment occurs, 
L: Market price level at which abandonment occurs. 
Since the market price P is determined exogenously, it changes over time in an uncertain 
way. A standard model for this stochastic process is geometric Brownian motion: 
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dP = µPdt + σPε dt , where 
ε is a random drawing from a standardized normal distribution. 
dt is the small length of time interval during which dP takes place. 
Since ε is a random drawing from a standardized normal distribution, dP has a normal 
distribution with 
        mean of dP = µPdt, and 
    variance of dP = σ2P2dt. 
Define V (P, t), the value of the investment, as a function of the price P and the time t. By 
a second-order Taylor series, dV can be approximated as 
dV = 22
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Substituting dP = µPdt + σPε dt into the above equation, we obtain Ito’s lemma 
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Since this is an infinite horizon problem, the variable t is not a decision variable and the 
derivative 
t
V
∂
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Taking expected value of both sides of the equation yields 
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since the expected value of dtε  is zero. 
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Step 1 - Deriving the functional form of the value of an idle project 
In equilibrium, the expected capital gain of an idle project (denoted by dV0(P)) should 
equal the normal return ( = ρV0(P)dt) from the value of the investment 
dtPPVPPV 

 + 22''0'0 )(2
1)( σµ - ρV0(P)dt = 0. 
Dividing the above equation by dt, yields the differential equation 
V0’(P) µP + 
2
1 V0’’(P) σ2P2  - ρV0(P) = 0. 
The general solution for this equation is of the form 
V0(P) = AP-α + BPβ, where 
- α =  2
2/12222
2
)8)2((2
σ
ρσµσµσ +−−−  < 0, and  (4) 
β = 2
2/12222
2
)8)2((2
σ
ρσµσµσ +−+−  > 1 (5) 
are the two roots of the quadratic equation −+− xxx µσ )1(
2
1 2 ρ  = 0 and A and B are constants 
to be determined [Dixit (1991)]. 
For an idle project, the value of an investment should go to zero as the price P goes to 
zero. Since α > 0 and β > 1, V0(P) = AP-α + BPβ goes to zero when P goes to zero only if A = 0. 
So the functional form of the value of an idle project (V0) becomes 
V0(P) = BPβ  (6) 
Step 2 - Deriving the functional form of the value of an active project 
For an active project, in equilibrium the following condition holds normal return = 
expected capital gain + net revenue flow. This means 
ρV1(P) dt = E[dV1] + (P – C)dt. 
Substituting E [dV] = dtPPVPPV 

 + 22''' )(
2
1)( σµ  from (3) into the equation above, dividing 
both sides by dt, and rearranging the equation yield 
V1’(P) µP + 
2
1  V1’’(P) σ2P2 - ρV1(P) + P – C = 0. 
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The general solution for this differential equation is V1(P) = P/(ρ - µ) – C/ρ + AP-α + BPβ, where 
P/(ρ - µ) – C/ρ is the present value of the net revenue and AP-α + BPβ can be interpreted as the 
value of the option to abandon the project.  
Clearly, as the price P goes to infinity, this option value of abandonment goes to zero. 
Since α > 0 and β > 1, AP-α + BPβ goes to zero when P goes to infinity only if B = 0. Therefore, 
the functional form of the value of an active investment project becomes 
V1(P) = P/(ρ - µ) – C/ρ + AP-α. (7) 
Step 3 - Deriving the investment trigger point and abandonment point 
At the investment trigger point H, the value of the option to invest (the value of the idle 
project) must equal the net value obtained by exercising it (value of the active project minus sunk 
cost of investment). So we must have 
V1(H) - V0 (H) = K. (8) 
This is the value-matching condition. The smooth-pasting condition requires that the two 
value functions meet tangentially 
V1’(H) - V0’(H) = 0. (9) 
Similarly, at the abandonment point L we have 
V1(L) - V0 (L) = -X, and (10) 
V1’(L) - V0’(L) = 0. (11) 
Substituting the definitions of V0 and V1 in (6) and (7) into (8), (9), (10), (11), we obtain the 
following system of four equations: 
KBHAHCH =−+−−
− βα
ρµρ )( , (12) 
0
)(
1 11 =−−−
−−− βα βαµρ BHAH , (13) 
XBLALCL −=−+−−
− βα
ρµρ )( , and (14) 
0
)(
1 11 =−−−
−−− βα βαµρ BLAL . (15) 
The parameters ρ, µ , σ2 can be estimated from empirical data. Then α, β can be obtained 
by inserting the estimates into formulas (4) and (5). Finally, substituting the estimates of ρ, µ , 
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σ2, α, β into the four equations (12), (13), (14), (15), the four unknowns A, B, L, H can be 
obtained numerically. 
 The two assumptions of irreversibility and uncertainty are approximately met for coffee 
growing. An investment in coffee planting incurs a heavy irreversible establishment sunk cost, 
the cost of building infrastructure and planting the trees. To a small coffee grower, coffee prices 
evolve exogenously with great uncertainty over time. 
The third condition, that investment opportunities remain open, does not truly exist in the 
coffee growing industry, which is a freely competitive market with over 25 million small 
producers worldwide. At times of lucrative prices, if a farmer waits rather than invests 
immediately, other farmers will enter and investment opportunities gradually diminish. Leahy 
(1993) examined this issue and showed, however, that the prices which trigger investment for a 
firm who anticipates the effects of competitive interactions is the same as those for a firm who 
ignores competition and considers the industry-wide investment as fixed. The reasoning 
underlying this result is that at the trigger price points, the value of the option to invest is equal to 
the value of the physical investment (an investor is indifferent between keeping the option or 
exercising it to obtain the investment project). Free competition reduces the value of the option 
to invest, but it does so by reducing the value of the physical investment project. Since 
competition reduces both the value of the option and the value of the physical investment project 
at the same time, the trigger price points between the two are unaffected. 
The model also requires that the investment has an infinite life and is non-depreciating. 
Land has an infinite life. Coffee trees and equipment can be replaced so that they can be 
productive infinitely. One way to ensure this is to add depreciation of equipment and coffee trees 
to variable costs. 
It is reasonable to assume that the variable production cost C does not vary significantly 
over time. Although diesel and fertilizer prices have increased during the past decade, coffee 
yield per hectare has also improved significantly. In addition, labor, one of the main inputs in 
coffee growing, has remained stable at 1.3 US$/manday for many years.  
Data and Analysis 
Empirical application of the entry-exit models requires data on coffee prices, coffee 
production, area planted, cost of capital, investment (fixed) cost, and variable production cost. 
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Data on coffee price and coffee production are obtained from the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO), which was established in London in 1963 under the auspices of the United 
Nations. The Vietnamese Statistical Yearbook provides data on coffee area and production in 
Vietnam. The data on the lending rates (cost of capital) in Vietnam from 1994-2002 are found on 
IMF’s website. 
 There are no official statistics on coffee production costs of Vietnamese coffee growers. 
The fixed and variable production costs, therefore, are estimated based on current input prices 
and the farming technology recommended by the Central Highland Institute of Science and 
Technology for Forestry and Agriculture. This farming technology has been widely adopted by 
Vietnamese growers. Coffee is a perennial crop with a life cycle of 20-35 years depending on 
variety. In Vietnam, new Robusta trees require about three years to yield the first commercial 
harvest. New planting takes place in May, June, or July, the early months of the rainy season. 
Coffee is a water-intensive crop. Each Robusta tree requires from 3,200 to 4,000 liters of 
irrigation water during the dry season from December to April. Coffee growing is also labor 
intensive. Weeding, irrigation, pruning, and harvesting are mostly done by manual labor. The 
trees bloom in January and it takes about 10 months to produce the ripe cherries. Harvest peaks 
in November, the end of the rainy season. 
Sunk (establishment) costs K include the costs of purchasing land, constructing an 
irrigation system, other farming infrastructure, and planting young coffee trees with 3 years until 
the first commercial harvest.  All these costs are calculated for a typical farm of an average size 
of 2 hectares. Total sunk cost is divided by the average yield of such a farm to obtain the sunk 
cost per pound of coffee output. These costs are itemized in Table 1. The sunk cost per pound is 
calculated to be 69.5 cents/lb at the exchange rate of 15,500 VND/US$ and average yield of 
2,080kg/hectare. This is the average yield achieved by farmers in Dak Lak province in 2000, 
according to a study by the Information Center of the Department of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (ICARD) and Oxfam (2002). 
Variable cost is also calculated based on the farming technology recommended by the 
Central Highland Institute of Science and Technology for Forestry and Agriculture. Unit variable 
cost is then normalized based on an average yield of 2,080 kg/hectare. Estimation is summarized 
in Table 2. Using the 2001 medium-term lending rate of 9.9% the unit total production cost is 
estimated to be 8,845 VND/kg (26.48 cents/lb). The cost of 8,845 VND/kg is close to the 8,821 
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VND/kg production cost of farmers in Cu Mgar, the largest coffee producing district in Dak Lak 
province, surveyed by Oxfam in 2001 (published in 2002). 
 
 
Table 1.  Establishment Costs for Robusta Coffee for a  
2-hectare Farm in Vietnam 
Inputs Year1 Year2 Year3 Total VND/kga US$ /lb
 ---------------- 1,000VND--------------   
Land purchase 20,000   20,000 4,807 0.14 
Soil preparation 4,000   4,000 962 0.03 
Irrigation pump, pipe 28,000   28,000 6,731 0.20 
Coffee seedlings 3,000   3,000 721 0.02 
Fertilizers 7,000 4,000 5,000 16,000 3,847 0.11 
Labor 8,000 7,000 7,000 22,000 5,288 0.155 
Irrigation  2,500 3,500 6,000 1,442 0.04 
Total 70,000 13,500 15,500 99,000 23,798 0.695 
a Assumes a yield of 2,080 kg/hectare (4,160 kg total production). 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Variable Costs for Robusta Production for a  
2-hectare Farm in Vietnam 
Inputs 1,000VND VND/kga US$/lb 
Fertilizers 7,200 1,730 0.05 
Labor 11,000 2,644 0.077 
Irrigation 5,600 1,346 0.039 
Depreciationb 2,400 577 0.017 
Pesticides, miscellaneous 800 192 0.007 
Variable cost 27,000 6,489 0.19 
a Assumes a yield of 2,080 kg/hectare (4,160 kg total production) 
bCoffee trees and fixed assets. 
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 It is estimated that upon exit about one-fourth of the original value of irrigation pump, 
engine, well, barn can be recovered since these items can be used for other crops. As a number of 
crops such as rubber, pepper, cotton, and cocoa can grow well on coffee land, the exit farmer can 
certainly resell the land at the original purchase price (price of bare land). There exists cost of 
removing abandoned coffee trees. When the trees are still small, the cost is minimal and can be 
offset by the value the farmer added to the land when he reclaimed it for the coffee trees 
(leveling, removing stumps, adding organic fertilizers). When the trees are old, they can be sold 
as timber. In practice, an abandoned coffee plantation can be sold at the price of bare land, and 
the coffee tree removing cost is assumed to be cancelled out by either added value to the land or 
the timber value and as such is not included in the exit costs. Therefore, the cost of abandoning 
the investment is estimated to be 19 cents/lb. 
The opportunity cost of capital ρ to a small farmer is determined by the income he can 
make from the best alternative use of that capital at the same risk. Due to data limitations, 
estimation of the profitability of substitute crops is not possible. Alternatively, opportunity cost 
of capital is approximated by the cost of capital, which is estimated to be the medium-term 
lending rate charged by local banks. The medium-term lending rate from 1994 to 2002 obtained 
from IMF statistical records (lending rate for years prior to 1994 is not available) is 14.92% per 
annum, and thus ρ = 0.1492 per annum. 
The price used in the model is the price for Robusta coffee bean paid to growers in 
Vietnam, recorded in monthly intervals from January 1990 to December 2002 by the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO). Although investment in coffee production is treated as 
an annual decision, producers sell coffee in months after harvest. The parameter estimates from 
monthly prices are annualized. By the ICO definition, this is the average price paid to the 
growers at the farm-gate. If the price P follows a random walk process without drift, then  
Pt = λPt-1 + ut , where λ = 1, Pt is the price at time t, and  (16) 
ut is assumed to be a white noise error term, having zero mean and constant variance. Subtracting 
Pt-1 from both sides of (16) yields 
 Pt - Pt-1 = λPt-1 - Pt-1 + ut or ∆Pt  = δ Pt-1 + ut  where δ = (λ - 1). 
If the null hypothesis that the coefficient δ = 0 (i.e. λ = 1) cannot be rejected, the result is 
consistent with a random walk model. The hypothesis is tested for three alternate models. 
Pt follows a random walk:  ∆Pt  = δ Pt-1 + α ∆Pt-1+ ut. 
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Pt follows a random walk with drift: ∆Pt  = β1 + δ Pt-1 + α ∆Pt-1+ ut. 
Pt follows a random walk with drift around a deterministic trend: 
∆Pt  = β1 + β2t + δ Pt-1 + α ∆Pt-1+ ut, 
where ut is a pure white noise error and ∆Pt-1 = (Pt-1 - Pt-2), which was added to make the error 
terms uncorrelated. Additional lagged terms were not necessary to reduce the residual error to 
white noise as verified by the Durbin-Watson statistics. Using monthly prices from 01/1990-
12/2002 (156 observations), the Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test fails to reject that δ = 0 (i.e. λ = 1) 
for all three equations at the confidence level of 0.1. So it is reasonable to treat the price P as 
following a random walk model without drift and trend. 
The annual variance rate σ2 and mean of the proportional change in price µ are estimated 
using the monthly coffee prices. Define:  
Pi : Nominal coffee price at end of the ith interval (i = 0,1,…, 155) 
ti – ti-1 : length of time interval in years = 12
1 , and  
θi = ln (
1−i
i
P
P ) for i = 1,…, 155, 
then s is given by the standard formula 
s = ∑
=
−−
n
i
in 1
2)(
1
1 θθ ,   where θ  is the mean of the θi’s, and 
1−−
=
ii tt
sσ = s* 12 . 
Using the monthly prices, s = 0.09342 and σ = 0.3236, so the volatility (σ) of the nominal coffee 
price facing Vietnamese coffee growers is estimated to be 32.36% a year. 
One way to estimate µ is to estimate the expected value of ln 
1−iP
Pi . From 
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   ln 
1−iP
Pi  ~ N 



 −−


 − −− 11
2
),(
2 iiii
tttt σσµ  where t is measured in years, and letting 
the expected value of ln 
1−iP
Pi be γ = )(
2 1
2
−−


 − ii ttσµ ,  µ can be derived as  
µ = 
2
1 2
σγ +− −ii tt . 
Using the monthly prices, γ is estimated to be -0.00461, which is not statistically different from 
zero, consistent with the conclusion from the Dickey-Fuller test that the drift rate of nominal 
price is zero. Using σ2 = 0.105 (from the estimate of σ above) and the formula  
µ = 2
1 2
σγ +− −ii tt , µ is estimated to be -0.00461*12 + 0.105/2 = -0.00282. 
Results 
The entry-exit model finds that a small farmer will enter coffee production when farm-
gate price rises above 47.2 cents/lb and will exit the business if price drops below 14.2 cents/lb. 
When price varies within the inactive zone 14.2-47.2, no entry or exit would occur, producing 
hysteresis. Price and planted area from 1990-2002 are plotted in Figure 1 to show how these 
results relate to the investment decisions of Vietnamese coffee growers. In interpreting the graph, 
it should be noted that there is one-year lag from the time the investment decision is made until 
young trees are physically planted in a new farm and recorded as new cultivation. 
Figure 1 shows three distinct periods. From 1990-1993, coffee prices stayed within the 
inactive zone, and there was no investment entry. Coffee area in 1994 basically stood at the same 
level of 1990, even though coffee prices had risen sharply (recall the lag in planting). The 
variation in growing area during this period probably was due to the replacement of old trees.  
From 1994-1999, prices stayed consistently above entry level, and consistent with the 
model results, planted area increased continuously by 59% a year from 1995 to 2000. In 2000-
2002, price fell back to the inactive zone and was near the exit level. According to the baseline 
scenario, there should be neither entry nor exit during those years. However, coffee area 
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increased by 3,400 hectares in 2001. This increase may have resulted from a 42 million US$ 
Arabica coffee development program funded by the French government’s Development Agency 
(AFD). No official data exist on the new Arabica area developed in 2001 under this program, but 
in the crop year 2002-2003, according to Tuoi Tre Newspaper another 10,000 hectares of 
Arabica was newly planted. If this figure is correct, Robusta area decreased by perhaps 44,000 
hectares in 2002.  
 
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
Pr
ic
e
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
P
la
nt
ed
 a
re
a
Average Yearly Price (US cents/pound)
Planted area (thousand hectares)
 
Figure 1 - Vietnam’s Investment Entry and Exit with 
Homogeneity in Cost 
 
 
The assumption of identical farmers can be relaxed by defining three groups of 
Vietnamese coffee growers with different yields, hence different average variable costs. All other 
parameters are assumed the same for the three groups.  
Upper entry 
threshold: 
47.19 cents/lb 
Lower exit 
bound: 14.22 
cents/lb
  15
Low cost producers: It is estimated that with the same amount of inputs worth 13,500,000 
VND/hectare, the most efficient farmers achieve a yield of 3 tons per hectare (Information 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development of Vietnam). At this yield, variable production 
cost would be calculated as 13.2 cents/lb, and the entry-exit trigger points for this group are H = 
38.8 cents/lb, and L = 10.2 cents/lb. 
Average cost producers: This group achieves a yield of 2.08 tons/hectare and average 
variable cost of 19 cents/lb, as presented in the baseline scenario. For this group the entry and 
exit price levels are H = 47.2cents/lb, and L = 14.2 cents/lb. 
High cost producers: This group comprises producers in marginal areas where soil is less 
fertile, transportation is more costly and irrigation water is scarce. It is estimated that with the 
same inputs, these inefficient farmers achieved only 70% of the average yield of 2.08 tons per 
hectare. At this productivity, their variable production cost would be around 27 cents/lb. The 
price levels for entry and exit for this group are H = 58.4 cents/lb, and L = 20 cents/lb. 
The effects of heterogeneity are depicted in Figure 2, where the entry and exit price levels 
are not two clear-cut ceiling and floor lines, but rather two corridors above and below. When 
price goes up to 38.8 cents/lb, efficient farmers start expanding planted area. If price continues to 
rise to 47.2 cents/lb, average cost farmers would enter. Less efficient farmers enter if price hits 
58.4 cents/lb. Conversely, when price drops to below 20 cents/lb, less efficient growers would 
start to exit, but efficient farmers would continue to stay until price drops to around 10 cents/lb. 
Again three distinct periods can be seen. From 1990-1993, when coffee price stayed within the 
inactive zone, there was no investment entry. Coffee areas in 1994 and in 1990 are almost the 
same. From 1994-1999, price stayed consistently above the entry level even for the inefficient 
producers. As a result, planted area increased, expanding to marginal areas, where land is less 
fertile, far from irrigation water source and more remote from transportation roads. From 2001-
2002, price fell below 20 cents/lb, the exit level for less efficient growers. As a result, the area 
planted to Robusta contracted in 2001 and 2002. 
The entry and exit prices also vary as the parameters change, most notably the cost of 
capital, the production cost which has been illustrated, and the volatility of coffee prices. Two 
alternative scenarios are simulated for average cost farmers. First, the cost of capital ρ is allowed 
to deviate by five percentage points around the baseline level of 14.92% per year. Second, the 
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volatility of coffee prices is permitted to rise to 40% and drop to 20% per year from the baseline 
level of 32.36% per year.  
When ρ increases, both the entry and exit prices increase. When ρ decreases from 
14.92% to 10% a year, the exit threshold falls from 14.2 to 13.2 cents/lb. This suggests that if the 
government wants to keep existing planted area through difficult years, given the availability of 
public resources, reducing the cost of capital through a credit subsidy might be a good policy. 
Changes in σ show that the higher the volatility of prices, the wider the gap between entry and 
exit prices and vice versa. This suggests that in the presence of some price stabilization 
mechanism, entry and exit would take place more frequently, reducing hysteresis. 
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Figure 2.  Vietnam’s Investment Entry and Exit with 
Heterogeneity in Cost 
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Who Should Grow Coffee? 
Due to large establishment sunk costs and a high degree of price uncertainty, the 
existence of price-below-cost periods following intervals of super-normal profits is inevitable. 
During price-below-cost periods such as the one in 2001-2002, only the most efficient coffee 
growers can make a positive profit while the majority of producers would experience losses. 
Among those producers with negative profits, however, are two distinct groups. The first 
contains inefficient producers who would have a negative profit in the long run. The second 
group comprises those producers who, on average, would generate a positive profit in the long 
run. A clear realization of the difference between the two groups is important for policy makers, 
since they often interpret all producers whose variable costs are greater than selling price as 
economically non-viable. For the Vietnamese coffee industry, at the 2001 price level of 15.12 
cents/lb, virtually all coffee producers operated at a loss. Only the most efficient producers 
(group A) could generate a positive cash inflow with variable costs around 13.2 cents/lb. Both 
producers with average efficiency (group B) and low inefficiency (group C) with variable costs 
of 19 cents/lb and 27cents/lb, respectively, lost 3.9 cents and 11.9 cents, respectively, for every 
pound of coffee produced. 
Although groups B and C both had variable costs greater than the selling price of 15.12 
cents/lb, they differed in one crucial aspect. The exit price for group B was about 14.2 cents/lb, 
which was still below the selling price of 15.12 cents/lb, while the exit threshold for group C was 
almost 20 cents/lb, well above 15.12 cents/lb. When coffee price hit 15.12 cents/lb, group B 
endured losses, but should continue to stay in the coffee business because it was economically 
optimal for them to do so, while for group C it was optimal to leave.  
Using the 2001 price and the sample parameter estimates as baseline, those who should 
grow coffee are producers with variable production costs below 19 cents/lb (6,500 VND/kg). 
Since the parameters employed in the model are estimates, the boundary of 19 cents/lb cannot be 
treated as exact, but it gives policy makers an indicator for defining efficient versus inefficient 
producers (as well as suitable versus unsuitable coffee areas).  
Many farmers started growing coffee during years of lucrative prices (such as 1994-1999) 
not realizing that, for high cost producers, it might not be profitable in the long run. Farmers in 
marginal areas (group C), despite high variable production costs, were able to make a profit at 
1994-1999 price levels, but do not appear to be economically viable in the long run. Credit 
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extended to this group should be for the purpose of switching to other crops such as rubber, 
cocoa, pepper, or cashew, which biologically suit their land better than coffee. 
Conversely, although efficient growers (with variable cost below 19 cents/lb) sustain 
losses during times of depressed prices, they are profitable in the long run. As shown by the 
model, it is economically sensible to continue financing them so that they get through cash flow 
problems during price-below-cost periods. The model helps define efficient versus inefficient 
producers in terms of production cost. Producers should be made aware of their long-term (real 
options) viability before making an investment decision. 
Sensitivity analysis shows that decreasing production costs would lower both the entry 
and exit bounds.  Reduction of coffee production costs depends largely on the availability of 
irrigation water and a more efficient use of fertilizers, which require additional investment in 
irrigation reservoirs and extension services. Irrigation reservoirs would provide farmers with a 
stable and cheaper source of water compared to private wells, which often drain at the end of the 
dry season during drought years. With readily available surface water, growers can afford a 
better irrigation regime and thus improve coffee yield. A better extension network would allow 
poor farmers, who have practiced coffee farming more by experience, spread by word of mouth, 
to gain a more efficient use of inputs. 
Following the 2001 price crisis, about 44,000 hectares of Robusta coffee was abandoned 
in Vietnam. This number is equivalent to 8.3% of total planted areas. Put another way, around 
91.7% of Vietnamese coffee growers survived the 2001 crisis. This is evidence that most 
Vietnamese farmers are efficient; they can compete successfully in the global coffee market. 
Therefore, there appears to be little ground for the recommendation by Vietnam’s Cocoa and 
Coffee Association that Vietnam should eliminate from 100,000 to 150,000 hectares of Robusta 
coffee.  
Summary and Conclusion 
This study analyzes how Vietnamese coffee growers invest or disinvest under uncertainty 
and irreversibility. The entry and exit decisions of coffee growers are modeled as real options, 
which refer to the rights to activate (to acquire) or to abandon (to sell) a physical investment 
project (an asset) at a predetermined price. These rights have value and, analogous to options on 
financial assets, can be quantified using financial option pricing methods. 
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Empirically, the investment model is built for a small Robusta grower in the Central 
Highlands in Vietnam. The selection of a small Robusta grower to represent Vietnamese coffee 
producers is based on three factors. First, nearly all coffee grown in Vietnam is of the Robusta 
variety. Second, about 80% of coffee is produced in the Central Highlands. Third, 85%-90% of 
coffee is grown by small farmers, each holding, on average, a 1-2 hectare farm. 
The model is applied to three groups of farmers. The high-cost group has a variable 
production cost of 27cents/lb. The average cost group has a variable production cost of 19 
cents/lb, and the figure for the low cost group is 13.2 cents/lb.  
The empirical results indicate that when coffee price increases to 38.9 cents/lb, efficient 
farmers enter production. If price continues to rise to 47.2 cents/lb, average cost farmers would 
enter. Less efficient farmers would enter if price hits 58.37 cents/lb. Conversely, when price 
drops to below 20 cents/lb, less efficient growers would start to exit. But efficient farmers would 
stay until price drops to about 10 cents/lb. 
The existence of price-below-cost periods following intervals of super-normal profits is 
inevitable in coffee growing due to large establishment costs and large variability of coffee 
prices. This implies that the common perception that producers who have variable costs higher 
than output price are inefficient is not always valid. As shown by the empirical model, during 
price-below-cost periods such as the one in 2001-2002, only the most efficient coffee growers 
can make a profit while the vast majority of producers would experience losses.  
Among those loss-making producers, however, there are two distinct groups. The first 
group contains those who would have a negative profit even in the long run. The second group 
comprises those producers who on average would generate a positive profit in the long run. At 
times of price-below-cost, although both groups appear to be in the same situation - suffering 
losses - they differ in that the second group is optimally running their farms by enduring losses 
and waiting for price to rebound, while for the first group at some price levels it is optimal to 
exit. A clear realization of the difference between the two groups is particularly important for 
policy makers and credit providers, since it allows them to channel credit and land in such a way 
that “truly” efficient farmers are encouraged to stay in the coffee business and inefficient farmers 
are encouraged to shift to other crops.  
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